

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

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USMISSION GENEVA

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C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 13684

VIENNA FOR MBFR DEL

GENEVA FOR SALT DEL

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM, SU

SUBJECT: MBFR - VIEWS OF SOVIET PROFESSOR KOSTKO

1. PROFESSOR Y. KOSTKO OF THE SOVIET INSTITUTE OF
WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, WHO HAD COME
TO THE UK TO ATTEND A CONFERENCE THE PREVIOUS WEEK-END,
CALLED ON TICKELL, HEAD OF THE NATO DEPARTMENT AT THE
FOREIGN OFFICE, ON NOVEMBER 20. TICKELL HAS GIVEN US A
COPY OF HIS RECORD OF THAT CONVERSATION FROM WHICH THE
FOLLOWING EXCERPTS RELATING TO MBFR ARE DRAWN.

2. TICKELL ASKED KOSTKO WHAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS DID THE
RUSSIANS HAVE IN MIND IN THEIR REFERENCE TO SUCH WEAPONS

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IN THEIR RECENT MBFR PROPOSALS? DID THEY WANT WHAT THEY

DESCRIBED AS FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS TO BE DISCUSSED IN MBFR OR SALT? KOSTKO TOOK A LONG TIME TO REPLY AND NEVER GAVE A COMPLETE ANSWER. BUT HE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS. THE REFERENCE IN THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS WAS "ONLY A PROPOSAL". IT WAS VERY HARD TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS: WHAT SEEMED TACTICAL TO ONE COUNTRY MIGHT SEEM STRATEGIC TO ANOTHER. NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE DISTRIBUTED SO WIDELY TO FORCES IN EUROPE THAT "NUCLEAR" AND "CONVENTIONAL" ELEMENTS COULD NOT REALLY BE SEPARATED. THE RUSSIANS HAD PROPOSED THAT FORCES SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN WITH THEIR EQUIPMENT: NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE PART OF THEIR EQUIPMENT: NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD THEREFORE BE WITHDRAWN TOO. HE AGREED THAT SOME NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS WERE NOT INTEGRATED WITH GROUND FORCES IN THIS WAY. FOR THEM PERHAPS THERE COULD BE A SEPARATE NEGOTIATION.

3. KOSTKO SAID THAT IN THE GLOBAL BALANCE OF POWER THE WEST RETAINED ITS SUPERIORITY. HENCE IF THE ALLIES HARPED TOO MUCH IN MBFR ON DISPARITIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, AND DEMANDED ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS IN CONSEQUENCE, THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE OBLIGED TO WIDEN THE ARGUMENT TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE GLOBAL SITUATION AS A WHOLE. IN ANY EVENT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO AGREE ON FIGURES IN MBFR. THE FORCES ON EACH SIDE IN EUROPE WERE ROUGHLY BALANCED. WHEN BRAITHWAITE (FCO) POINTED OUT THAT EVEN THE SOVIET PROPOSALS REQUIRED AGREEMENT ON A DATA BASE, KOSTKO SUGGESTED THAT WE MIGHT DO AS IN SALT I AND RELY ON FIGURES PUBLISHED IN THE WEST.

4. KOSTKO SAID THAT ANY SOVIET AND US FORCES WITHDRAWN FROM EUROPE IN MBFR SHOULD BE DISBANDED ON THEIR RETURN HOME. WHAT OTHERWISE WOULD BE THE PURPOSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS? IF THEY GENUINELY WANTED DETENTE AND UNDIMINISHED SECURITY, BOTH SIDES SHOULD AVOID CHEATING BY SUCH MEANS AS REDEPLOYING THEIR FORCES, OR IMPROVING THEM SO AS TO DO BETTER WITH FEWER OF THEM (HE REPEATED THIS POINT WITH EMPHASIS).

5. COMMENT: THIS IS THE SECOND VISIT KOSTKO HAS PAID TO
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LONDON THIS YEAR. IN FEBRUARY HE WAS HERE WITH PROFESSOR KULISH AND HAD EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH IISS AS WELL AS FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIALS. HUNT AND BERTRAM OF IISS ARE BOTH INCLINED TO THINK THAT KOSTKO HAS A CERTAIN INFLUENCE ON OFFICIAL SOVIET MBFR THINKING AND REPRESENTS A POINT OF VIEW NOT TOTALLY ACADEMIC. HE IS, THEY POINT OUT, ONE OF THE LEADING WRITERS ABOUT MBFR IN THE SOVIET UNION. IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH IISS THIS WEEK KOSTKO

REPORTEDLY TOOK A SLIGHTLY LESS RIGID ATTITUDE TOWARD
MBFR THAN IS REFLECTED BY SOVIET BUREAUCRATS,ERTRAM
NOTED TO US.

ANNENBERG

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